Prison-Based Education and Re-Entry into the Mainstream Labor Market by John H. Tyler & Jeffrey R. Kling
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
PRISON-BASED EDUCATION AND RE-ENTRY









Tyler: Brown University, National Center for the Study of Adult Learning and Literacy, and National Bureau
of Economic Research; Kling: Princeton University and National Bureau of Economic Research.  The
authors wish to thank William Bales, John L. Lewis, Brian Hays, and Stephanie Bontrager of the Florida
Department  of  Corrections  and  Duane  Whitfield  of  the  Florida  Education  and  Training  Placement
Information Program for providing the data; and Aaron Sparrow and Thu Vu for invaluable research
assistance. We also thank seminar participants at Michigan, Illinois, MIT, UCLA, RAND, UC-Berkeley,
Maryland, UC-Davis, and Case Western for helpful comments. This research was partially supported with
grants from the  Russell Sage Foundation. Additional support was provided by the National Science
Foundation (SBE-9876337), the Princeton Office of Population Research (NICHD 5P30-HD32030), the
National Center for the Study of Adult Learning and Literacy, and the Princeton Industrial Relations Section.
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
©2006 by John H. Tyler and Jeffrey R. Kling  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source.Prison-Based Education and Re-Entry into the Mainstream Labor Market
John H. Tyler and Jeffrey R. Kling
NBER Working Paper No. 12114
March 2006
JEL No. J31, J38
ABSTRACT
We estimate the post-release economic effects of participation in prison-based General Educational
Development (GED) programs using a panel of earnings records and a rich set of individual
information from administrative data in the state of Florida. Fixed effects estimates of the impact of
participating in the GED education program show post-release quarterly earnings gains of about 15
percent for program participants relative to observationally similar non-participants. We also show,
however,  that  these  earnings  gains  accrue  only  to  racial/ethnic  minority  offenders  and  any
GED-related earnings gains for this group seem to fade in the third year after release from prison.
Estimates comparing offenders who obtained a GED to those who participated in GED-related prison
education programs but left prison without a GED show no systematic evidence of an independent
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I. Introduction 
A troubling fact associated with the historically high incarceration rates of the last twenty 
years is that they have had a disproportionate effect on disadvantaged and minority men, 
individuals who have traditionally maintained marginal positions in the mainstream labor 
market. An important question therefore is to what extent education and training programs 
generally available in correctional facilities help criminal offenders successfully reintegrate into 
the mainstream labor market. One of the most ubiquitous education opportunities available to 
inmates who lack a high school diploma is the ability to study for and obtain a General 
Educational Development (GED) credential.
1   
Prior research on the effects of “prison GEDs” on post-release outcomes is relatively limited 
in spite of the fact that the 2000 Census of State and Federal Correctional Facilities (Bureau of 
Justice Statistics 2003) showed that 83 percent of the state correctional facilities in the U.S. 
offered “secondary education programs,” of which the primary type are GED preparation 
programs. Furthermore, virtually all of the previous research has examined the relationship 
between obtaining a GED and the probability of recidivating, giving little attention to whether or 
not prison GEDs are related to post-release labor market outcomes.  The widespread availability 
of the GED credentialing program for incarcerated individuals raises the question of whether 
there are, in fact, any post-release economic benefits associated with participation in a prison-
based GED program.
2 
                                                 
1 To obtain a GED individuals have to pass exams that cover math, science, social studies, reading, and writing. All 
of the test items are multiple choice except for a section in the writing exam that requires GED candidates to write 
an essay. The total test time if all tests are taken at the same time is about seven and three-quarters hours. 
2 While there has been little research examining the potential effects of passing the exams and obtaining a GED in 
prison or jail, there has been substantial work in the past ten years on the general labor market effects of a GED. 
Cameron and Heckman (1993) showed that GED holders were not the labor market equivalents of regular high 
school graduates.  Recent work has tended to indicate that dropouts who leave school with very low skills benefit   2 
Past research on prison-based education programs has been plagued with the fierce selection 
issues that determine participation in these programs and data that has been largely unsuited to 
addressing these issues. Furthermore, the prior work in this area has considered only a single 
counterfactual: what is the impact of participating in prison-based education versus not 
participating. We advance this line of inquiry in two ways. First, we are able to utilize a much 
richer and more appropriate data set than has previously been available for examining the impact 
of prison-based education programs. Second, we examine prison-based GED programs relative 
to two separate and policy-relevant counterfactuals. 
The first research question we examine is the post-release economic value to inmates of 
having a prison-based GED program. The research here compares the outcomes of inmates who 
obtained a prison-based GED to those of dropout offenders who did not participate in any prison-
related GED education. This exercise addresses the question of what would we expect if there 
were no prison-based secondary education program. On this question we find that minority 
offenders who obtained a “prison GED” had earnings gains of about 15 percent in the first two 
years post-release relative to observationally similar minority offenders who did not participate 
in GED-related education programs while in prison. We find no post-release benefits for white 
offenders, and we also find that any earnings gains for minority offenders dissipate after two 
years. 
Our second research question is whether or not there is any value in obtaining a “prison 
GED” relative to participating in prison-based GED education, but leaving prison without the 
                                                                                                                                                             
from obtaining a GED, while there are no payoffs to the credential for dropouts who leave school with higher skills 
(Murnane, Willett, and Boudett 1999; Murnane, Willett, and Tyler 2000; Tyler, Murnane, and Willett 2000). 
Estimates from these studies generally show that after about five years, the earnings of low skilled dropouts who 
obtain a GED are 15-20 percent higher than those of low skilled uncredentialed dropouts.  Heckman, Hsse, and 
Rubinstein (2000) (HHR) do not find the same pattern as the aforementioned studies. An important difference in the 
two sets of findings is that HHR do not allow time for the effects of the GED to accrue, a result that the other 
authors found to be important.   3 
credential. This parameter approximates the post-release signaling value of the GED in the labor 
market. We find, at most, only weak evidence of a signaling effect of the GED credential and 
only for minority offenders. 
To conduct this research, we worked with the Department of Corrections in Florida to create 
a unique administrative data set containing information on individuals who were in a Florida 
state prison at any time between 1994 and 1999, linked to demographics, education program 
participation, and earnings records.  Our earnings measures are based on working in the 
mainstream economy (specifically, jobs covered by unemployment insurance).  We do not 
attempt to study total income, but rather focus on the more proximate objective of most public 
policy directed toward former inmates—legitimate taxpaying employment—for which we can 
construct a panel of data for individuals for years both before and after prison spells. Using these 
data we estimate separate models for white and minority group offenders because we believe 
there are important differences in the background characteristics of these groups that could affect 
their post-release labor market potential.
3 
We have no clear exogenous source of variation in GED status in our sample, and as a result 
we suggest caution in attaching a strictly causal explanation to our findings. While we control for 
all time-invariant heterogeneity, it could be the case that unmeasured, time-varying differences 
between offenders who do and do not obtain a prison-based GED lend an unknown bias to our 
                                                 
3 In particular, minority group offenders tend to be younger and are more likely to be in prison for a drug-related 
offense than are the white offenders in our data. The median age of minority group offenders upon prison entry is 24 
years-old, while the white offenders in our data are 28 when we observe them entering the prison spell of interest. In 
terms of offense type, 13 percent of the minority offenders in our data are in prison on a drug-related charge, while 
only five percent of the white offenders are in prison for crimes related to drug use or distribution. Meanwhile, 19 
percent of the white offenders are in prison for crimes related to property theft and/or burglary, while only 10 
percent of the minority offenders are incarcerated for property-related crimes. Overall, the distribution of minority 
offenders in Florida’s prisons in the middle to late 1990s is different from that for white offenders in ways that may 
be related to labor market potential, the prison-GED experience, or to both.  For our purposes, “minority group 
members” refers to everyone who is not coded as white, non-Hispanic in the data. For expositional simplicity 
minority group members will often be referred to as “minority offenders” in this paper.   4 
results. For example, if offenders for whom the prison experience is a positive life-altering 
transformation also tend to obtain a GED, our findings overestimate the causal impact of a GED 
on post-release earnings. If on the other hand, inmates who become more criminally socialized 
while in prison tend to enroll in GED programs to curry favor with prison officials, our findings 
would underestimate the causal impact of prison GEDs. Nevertheless, we believe that our 
estimates give the best look to date at the effectiveness of this major prison-based education 
program. Furthermore, since we show that our preferred estimates are substantially smaller than 
naïve estimates mirroring prior research, we believe it likely that earlier work in this area has 
overestimated the benefits of prison-based education programs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes our conceptual 
framework.  Section III discusses our data.  Our analytical methods are presented in section IV.  
Section V presents descriptive statistics, and regression results are reported in section VI.  
Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  Conceptual Framework 
There are at least two mechanisms through which the GED could increase wages or 
employment for incarcerated individuals.
4  First, to the extent that individuals have to study and 
learn new skills to pass the GED exams, they may increase their human capital, which in turn 
may lead to increased wages (Becker 1993). This may be an especially important avenue for 
incarcerated GED candidates, since their pre-GED skill levels are likely lower than those of 
dropouts in the “free world.” Second, the GED may serve as a “labor market signal” allowing 
                                                 
4  In principle, the GED could positively impact labor market outcomes if inmates use their GED to obtain post-
incarceration higher education or training, but this is not likely to be an important mechanism since the data indicate 
that GED holders obtain very little post-secondary education or company-provided training (Boudett 2000; 
Murnane, Willett, and Tyler 2000; Tyler 2001).   5 
employers to identify individuals they suspect of having productive attributes such as higher 
cognitive skills or motivation levels within the pool of dropout job applicants (Spence 1973). 
A key issue in studying the effect of the GED on labor market outcomes is the omitted 
variable problem:  individuals who obtain GEDs in prison may have had attributes that would 
have led to superior labor market outcomes than non-GED holders even if they did not have a 
GED.  For example, a GED may simply be a proxy for intelligence or motivation that would 
have lead to greater employment and earnings anyway, with no causal role for the GED itself.   
Attention to omitted variables in studying the effects of correctional education on 
subsequent outcomes has been limited.  A 1999 survey of the literature by Wilson et al. (1999) 
cited eight studies that included an evaluation of the relationship between the GED or the GED 
plus some additional Adult Basic Education (ABE) and the likelihood of returning to prison -- 
the principal outcome in nearly all studies of the impacts of correctional education. Five of the 
eight studies found that offenders who obtained a GED were less likely to recidivate than those 
who did not. However, the authors of the research review point out that “…all of these studies 
had weak research methodologies, simply comparing either participants with nonparticipants or 
program noncompleters, with little to no control or adjustment for selection bias” (Wilson et al. 
1999, pg. 14).  A review that directly discussed the models used to study the impact of 
correctional education programs on outcomes states that “[t]he control variables were generally 
restricted to gender, race, and age…[and only one study] controlled for important sources of 
selection bias between participants and nonparticipants, such as prior criminal history, in the 
analysis of recidivism” (Wilson, Gallagher, and MacKenzie 2000, pg. 355). 
We are aware of only one study that focused specifically on the linkage between prison-
based education programs and labor market outcomes. The work of Steurer, Smith, and Tracy   6 
(2001) found higher subsequent earnings among education program participants.
5  Unfortunately, 
this study does not separate participation in GED preparation programs from participation in 
other prison-based education programs such as Adult Basic Education classes and English 
Second Language classes, so it is not clear what we learn from it about the GED. 
Wilson et al. (2000) point to several potential selection mechanisms that could lend an 
upward bias to the estimated impact of correctional education programs on post-release 
outcomes. Selection mechanisms in the prison setting could work through both individual 
choices and through administrative procedures, since enrollment in correctional education 
programs is predicated on variables such as good behavior and time to release. Fixed 
characteristics of the individual such as self-control or motivation that might affect post-release 
outcomes could also affect placement in a GED program through both self- and administrative 
selection processes. More transitory characteristics such as motivation toward positive life 
changes and attitudes towards society and towards work could work in the same ways.
6 
There could also be unobserved fixed and transient factors that could lead to underestimates 
of the causal impact of GED program participation. For example, in interviews of offenders just 
                                                 
5 This study uses prison records linked to UI earnings, as we do.  Relative to offenders with no participation in 
prison-based education programs, unconditional estimates indicated that the “treatment” group of offenders who 
received some prison-based educational services had lower estimated recidivism rates three years after release, 
though the differences were not statistically significant. The treatment group also had higher annual earnings in the 
first, second, and third years after release. Only the first year earnings differences were statistically significant 
($7,775 versus $5,980), and the estimated differences declined over time. There were no discernable differences in 
employment rates between those who did and did not receive education programming while in prison. 
6 Sampson and Laub (1993) and Thornberry and Christenson (1984) indicate that program participants may have a 
higher level of social bond to conventional, non-criminal society than do program nonparticipants. These authors 
posit that program participants may be more likely to be married, to have children with whom they are in contact, to 
have had a job before incarceration, and so. Assuming such factors lead to more positive post-release outcomes, 
failure to control for such attributes will lead to overestimates of the effect of education program participation on 
outcomes.  Zamble and Porporino (1988) offer a conjecture that a sentence to prison may act as a critical life event 
for some offenders resulting in a change in motivation to both participate in correctional programs and conduct 
one’s life in a more positive manner post-release. In this model any estimated program effects could simply be 
measures of the commitment of program participants to a life away from crime rather than effects of the program 
itself on outcomes.     7 
prior to release Steurer, Smith, and Tracy (2001) found that prison-education program 
participants had lower levels of motivation in regard to several labor market activities including 
the “motivation to get a job, a better job, or higher pay” or the “motivation to improve job 
performance” than did program non-participants. At the same time, offenders in the Steurer et al 
study who participated in prison-based education programs indicated a higher motivation to both 
“look good to prison or parole officials to get out” and to “get a better situation in prison” than 
did offenders who did not participate in education programming while in prison.
7 Thus, in their 
study participation in education programming seemed to be driven more by a desire to impress 
prison and parole officials and improve one’s situation in prison than by a desire to impact one’s 
post-release labor market outcomes. 
One consistent lesson from the prior research on correctional-based education programs is 
that the positive effects found in the literature are perhaps compromised by research designs that 
fail to account, even in the most rudimentary ways, for unobserved heterogeneity between 
program participants and nonparticipants. We attempt to address these shortcomings both 
through our use of rich data and through fixed effects estimation that has not been previously 
employed. 
 
                                                 
7 Neither of these differences between the treatment and comparison group was statistically significant at the 0.01 
level, but the mean differences on the five-point Likert scale variables were non-trivial. On the question “motivation 
to look good to prison or parole officials to get out,” the mean for education program participants  was 2.77 and that 
for the comparison group was 2.65. On the question “motivation to get a better situation in prison” the respective 
results were 2.55 and 2.45 (Steurer, Smith, and Tracey 2001). The only question in the “motivation survey” of 
Steurer that showed a statistically significant response at the 0.01 level was a question about the “motivation to feel 
better about self” where the comparison group scored 0.11 mean points higher, suggesting that the responses cited 
above were likely close to statistical significance, something that cannot be determined from the reported results in 
the paper.   8 
III.  Data 
To determine whether ex-convicts who acquire a GED while in prison fare better in the 
mainstream labor market than former offenders who do not possess the credential, we use a 
unique data set constructed for this project by the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC), the 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and the Florida Education and Training Placement 
Information Program. About 10,000 of the approximately 144,000 dropouts who were entered a 
Florida prison at some time between 1992 and 2000 obtained a GED while they were 
incarcerated.
8  The master data set from Florida contains basic demographic, criminal justice, 
and test score information, along with the quarterly earnings for males who were incarcerated in 
Florida state prisons any time between 1994 and 2000. Quarterly earnings for the sample come 
from the Florida Unemployment Insurance (UI) system and cover the third quarter of 1993 
through the first quarter of 2002.  All earnings are deflated to 2002 constant dollars using the 
CPI-U deflator. 
We include in our analysis individuals who had a new commitment to a Florida prison after 
October 1994 and who had expected release dates that were early enough to allow for at least 12 
quarters of post-release data.
9  The master data set from which we form our analytic sample 
contains information on 24,764 males who fit this criterion. Among these individuals are 2,957 
                                                 
8 In Florida, offenders housed in virtually all state prisons have the opportunity to test for the GED provided they 
meet certain guidelines.  We note that the count of 144,000 dropouts includes individuals for whom information on 
education level is missing. When the statistics are limited to individuals for whom education level is known, there 
are about 108,000 dropouts who entered Florida prisons between 1992 and 2000. 
9 As a result of the 12-quarter criterion, no one in our analytic data set entered prison after March, 1999. Individuals 
admitted to a Florida prison prior to December 1994 were eligible for “control release.” Control release is an 
administrative function that was used to manage the state prison population within lawful capacity. In the era of 
control release many inmates were not in prison long enough to participate in academic programs, and those who 
were likely differed in important ways from prisoners who were being granted control release. As a result, we have 
limited our analysis to individuals who were admitted to Florida prisons after control release was terminated.  We 
actually use people who were admitted on or after October 1, 1994, because in our data no offenders admitted during 
October and November of 1994 were given a control release.     9 
offenders who obtained a GED while incarcerated in a Florida prison at some time between 
October 1994 and March 1999. We are able to use data on 1,967 GED holders who have valid 
Social Security numbers (discussed below) and non-missing values on key variables used in the 
analysis. We also analyze 10,989 offenders who both lacked a high school diploma when they 
entered prison and did not obtain a GED while incarcerated and whose calendar quarters of entry 
into prison and forecasted release quarter from prison were the same as that of at least one GED 
holder. 
Using information on all movements of individuals in the Florida Department of Corrections 
system we are able to construct distinct prison spells for each individual based on the date of 
incarceration for a new commitment and the date of prison release.
10  In analyzing the impact of 
the GED on the post-release outcomes of offenders, there is a defining spell for GED holders that 
we call the “target spell,” defined as the prison spell in which the GED holder obtained his 
credential. The years and quarters in which all observed target spells began formed the basis for 
searching the data base for uncredentialed dropouts who entered prison at approximately the 
same times.
11 
We will employ two different comparison groups in order to answer our two different 
research questions. The first group is composed of offenders who entered prison without a high 
school diploma and who either attempted but failed the GED exams or who took GED 
preparation classes but never attempted the GED exams. For expositional convenience we will 
call this group the GED “failers” even though a substantial portion of this group never attempted 
                                                 
10 Our spells begin upon entry to jail for an eventual prison spell.  Specifically, we impute a spell beginning date 
using prison entry date minus jail credit days.  In our definition a spell must last more than one day and a spell is 
assumed to continue until a permanent release that lasts for more than one day is observed. If there is a subsequent 
entry into prison for that individual, a second spell begins and ends according to the same guidelines.   
11 We analyze one spell per individual, selecting the earliest one (if any) where there was at least one GED holder 
who entered prison in the same calendar quarter and had the same prison sentence length (rounded to half-years).   10 
the GED exams. Comparisons between GED passers and the dropouts in this “failing” group 
approximate the signaling value of the GED on post-release earnings. We note that to the extent 
that the GED passers acquire more prison-related human capital than the failers, contrasts 
between these groups will, of course, overstate the signaling value of the GED. 
A second comparison group is composed of offenders who entered prison without a high 
school diploma and who were never enrolled in any GED preparation courses. These are the 
GED program non-participants. A third potential comparison group we could use is offenders 
who entered prison with a high school diploma. All preliminary investigations of the data 
indicate that GED holders (and all other dropout offenders) had consistently worse outcomes 
than did regular high school graduates, both before prison entry and upon release from prison. 
This matches what Cameron and Heckman (1993) and others have found for “free world” GEDs 
when compared to regular high school graduates. As a result we focus in this paper on 
comparisons between offenders who obtain a GED while in prison and the two comparison 
groups of dropout offenders who do not obtain a GED while incarcerated. 
Social Security Numbers (SSNs) were used to link the Florida DOC data to the UI earnings 
data. All SSNs in our data were verified by programmers at the federal Social Security 
Administration based on standard verification algorithms used by the Employment Verification 
Service that matched DOC data on the digits of the SSN, date of birth, sex, and name to SSA 
records with some tolerance for clerical error. As might be expected in data on criminal 
offenders, about 19 percent of the sample lacks a valid SSN. Individuals with non-valid SSNs are 
more likely to be minority, a non-Florida resident, and unemployed at the time of arrest. Slightly 
over 20 percent of the potential non-attempting dropouts have non-valid SSNs, while only 15 to   11 
16 percent of the other three groups (GED passers, GED failers, and high school graduates) have 
non-valid SSNs. 
  
IV.  Analytical Methods 
Our analyses will primarily be concerned with measuring post-release quarterly earnings as 
measured by Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records and post-release employment as 
inferred by non-zero UI quarterly earnings. Since UI earnings are recorded quarterly, we account 
for time in calendar quarters. Previous research has analyzed outcomes using time since actual 
release from prison as the post-release time metric.  However, our regression models below are 
specified in terms of covariates and constructs of time that are known at the time the prison spell 
begins.  Because of the ability of prisoners to affect their release date through “good behavior” 
and program participation, actual release date is endogenous, and not pre-determined.  We 
address this issue by measuring release time relative to the forecasted release date, rather than 
time relative to when the offender was actually released.  While this issue is important in 
principle, we find in practice that GED recipiency has little association with the deviation of 
actual release date from forecasted release date, and consequently the use of forecasted versus 
actual release dates has little impact on our results.
12 
We use three definitions of time in our analysis.  Time in quarters relative to the start of an 
individual’s target incarceration spell is indexed by “s” and we refer to it as “s-time”. For 
example, s = -1 refers to the calendar quarter before the entry of an individual to their target 
spell in prison. Time relative to the forecasted release date of an offender based upon sentencing 
                                                 
12 Offenders who leave prison with a GED and those who never take any GED courses spend on average about a 
month and a half longer in prison than their forecasted release date would predict, while offenders who take GED 
courses but do not obtain the credential spend about two months longer than their predicted sentence.   12 
information in our data is indexed by “r” and we refer to it as “r-time.” For example, r = 1 refers 
to the calendar quarter after the forecasted release date of an offender from prison.  We index the 
quarter of actual release by “t”, and refer to it as “t-time.”  Some of our regression analyses pool 
data from s-time and r-time, such as the four quarters before incarceration and the four quarters 
after forecasted release.  We use these two concepts of time because we believe it is more 
meaningful for analysis of pre-prison outcomes to pool results around the beginning of 
incarceration and for analysis of post-prison outcomes to pool results around the time of 
forecasted release date -- rather than having a single anchor point in time.
13 
Our empirical analyses focus on post-release labor market outcomes. We will compare the 
post-release outcomes of offenders who obtain a GED while in prison relative to the post-release 
outcomes of the two dropout comparison groups. While we have no clear source of exogenous 
variation in GED status in these data, we do have a substantially richer set of available covariates 
to bring to the analysis than previous studies, and the longitudinal UI earnings data allow us to fit 
models that control for individual, time-invariant fixed effects. We use the following variable 
definitions: 
·  Yit = quarterly UI earnings for individual i in time (year and quarter) t.
14  
                                                 
13 To be concrete, consider individuals X and Y who entered prison at the same time and who have forecasted 
sentence lengths of 8 quarters and 16 quarters, respectively.  Analysis in s-time is most useful for pre-prison 
outcomes.  At s = -2, both offenders have not yet begun their incarceration spell, so we can meaningfully compare 
their pre-prison outcomes.  Pooling results on post-spell outcomes at time s = 10 is not very meaningful because Y 
will likely still be in prison.  Analysis in r-time is most useful for post-prison outcomes.  At r = 2, it is likely that 
both offenders will have recently re-entered mainstream society, so we use r-time for post-spell analyses pooling 
individuals in r-time.  At r = -10, X is not in prison, but Y is in prison so the pre-prison outcome is not observed.   
14 UI earnings are not available for out-of-state earnings or for jobs that are not usually covered by the UI system, 
such as self-employment, work which may be “off the books” such as domestic service or informal child care, or for 
employers who do not report earnings. Thus, UI earnings may understate “true” earnings. A comparison of data 
from UI and data with more complete coverage from the Social Security Administration (SSA) found that average 
earnings from SSA data were about 25% higher. Self-reported earnings for adult men were 30% higher than UI 
reports, with the additional difference apparently due mainly to uncovered jobs rather than out-of-state jobs;  in an 
evaluation of JTPA training, the differences between the treatment and control groups were similar for survey and   13 
·  GEDi = a (0,1) indicator for whether individual i obtained a GED while incarcerated.  
·  AGE = a set of two variables containing age and age squared when Y is measured. 
·  YRQTR = a set of dummies for the year and quarter in which Y is measured. 
·  Xi = a set of covariates that includes: 
-- EDUC (a set of indicators for years of completed schooling), 
-- predicted sentence length, 
-- marital status and number of dependents upon prison spell entry, 
-- years in Florida prior to prison spell, 
-- whether or not a Florida resident at prison entry, 
-- state or region of birth, 
-- whether or not employed prior to arrest and conviction, 
-- industry and occupation of employment prior to arrest and conviction, 
-- whether or not an English speaker, 
-- whether or not a confirmed U.S. citizen or alien, 
-- cumulative years in prison prior to the target spell, 
-- number of disciplinary reports ever accumulated in prison prior to the target spell, 
-- type of offense for target spell in prison, and 
-- a measure of cognitive skills at beginning of the target spell
15 
 
A regression model for the simplest model of mean differences between GED and non-GED 
holders is given in equation 1. 
(1)    it it it GED Y 1 1 1 e d b + + =  
To match the typical model found in the literature on prison-based interventions the first 
regression adjusted estimating equation we employ is: 
(2)    it i it it it it EDUC YRQTR AGE GED Y 2 23 22 21 2 20 e b b b d b + + + + + =  
                                                                                                                                                             
UI employment rates, suggesting that between group differences may remain quite informative even when levels 
differ (Kornfeld and Bloom 1999). 
15 The measure of cognitive skills that we employ is the Test of Adult Basic Education (TABE). The first stop for 
offenders entering the Florida prison system is the “reception center” where they are processed. While at the 
reception center, all offenders are administered the Survey test battery of the TABE. This test is particularly 
appropriate for our use since it is administered before any prison interventions. Since different versions of the TABE 
tests were administered during the period we cover, and since TABE scores are not necessarily equitable across 
versions, we created a vector of 58 TABE score by version indicators. We control for TABE scores with this vector 
of indicators.   14 
where i indexes person. We fit equation 2 on a stacked four quarters of r-time earnings data: r = 1 
through r = 4 in one instance, r = 5 through r = 8 next, and then r = 9 through r = 12. This allows 
us to estimate d2 for the 1
st, 2
nd, and 3
rd year after the forecasted release date. Using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), we fit equation 2 separately for the two different comparison groups. We 
also fit separate models for white offenders and minority group offenders. Estimates of d2 
provide estimates of the average difference in quarterly earnings between GED holders and 
uncredentialed dropouts in (respectively) the first, second, and third years after prison release, 
depending on what r-times are used. 
In a third model we include the other control variables described above, bringing to bear 
considerably more information than has heretofore been used in studying prison-based education 
programs. Equation 3 illustrates the additional variables, 
(3)    it i it it it it X YRQTR AGE GED Y 3 33 32 31 3 30 e b b b d b + + + + + =  
where X contains the variables discussed above that are not in EDUC, AGE, or YRQTR. 
Equation 3 offers substantial advantages over prior research on prison education programs 
since it utilizes the rich set of control variables available in our Florida data. We can, however, 
use longitudinal nature of the UI earnings data to push the analysis a step further by estimating 
the fixed effects model of equation 4: 
(4)    it i i it it it it it it X AFT YRQTR AGE GED AFT Y 4 43 42 41 4 40 * e a b b b d b + + + + + + =  
Equation 4 is fit using pre-spell earnings or employment data from quarters s = –4 through s 
= –1 stacked with post-release earnings: r = 1 through r = 4 in one instance, r = 5 through r = 8 in 
a second estimation, and r = 9 through r = 12 in a third estimation. A time-invariant, fixed effect 
for each individual is captured in ai.  In this setting the variable AFT equals zero in the s-time 
quarters and one in the r-time quarters, and it captures the main effect of being in the labor   15 
market in post-release period relative to the period before prison entry.  The interaction of AFT 
and X essentially allows main effects of X in the regression for changes in the outcome within 
individuals over time.
16  GED in equation 4 equals zero for everyone in s-time, switching to one 
in r-time for those who obtained a prison-GED.  In computing standard errors in all three models, 
we account for dependence of the errors within persons, across time. 
We also considered using a regression discontinuity design to study the impact of a prison-
GED, since a sharp cutoff on GED test scores determines who does or does not obtain a GED.   
Our discussions with Florida Department of Corrections officials who administer the GED 
program suggest, however, that such a design could yield upwardly biased estimates of the 
impact of the GED. Inmates in Florida are widely discouraged from taking the GED exams until 
there is a very good chance, based on scores on GED practice exams, that they will achieve a 
passing score. Given this severe screening on who takes the GED exams in Florida’s prisons, we 
believe that the five percent who do take the exams without passing are not comparable to those 




                                                 
16  For example, if there were one observation of the outcome before prison and one after, an interaction of AFT and 
X in a fixed effects model would control for changes in the outcome related to time invariant characteristics like type 
of conviction offense.  Time varying coefficients for time invariant characteristics has also been used by Jacobson, 
Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) in the context of evaluating the effect of job loss on later earnings and Ashenfelter and 
Hyslop (2001) in measuring the effects of arbitration on wages. 
17 This policy is reflected in the fact that of all the individuals in our data with a record of ever taking the GED 
exams while in prison, only five percent never achieved a passing score. This compares with about a twenty five 
percent non-pass rate among free world GED candidates in Florida over the same period, based on our calculations 
using free world GED data from Florida. In regression discontinuity estimates we do find that offenders who score 
just above the passing threshold, and obtain a GED, have quarterly earnings by the second year that are a statistically 
significant $400 greater than those who score just below the threshold. However, we do not believe the conditions 
hold to interpret this as the causal impact of the GED.   16 
V.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 compares basic descriptive statistics across GED holders and the two comparison 
groups in the earnings/employment sample. GED holders are substantially more likely to be 
white than are the two uncredentialed dropout groups. About 60 percent of the GED holders are 
white compared to roughly 45 percent in the two uncredentialed dropout groups. Mean years of 
completed schooling at prison entry are very similar across the groups, while GED passers and 
failers tend to be younger than the program non-participants who received no GED-related 
education while in prison. 
In terms of criminal justice related factors, offenders who obtain a GED during the prison 
spell under study appear to be substantially more likely to have had a previous stay in prison 
(about 24 percent compared to 14 and 18 percent for the uncredentialed dropout groups).
18 
However, some portion of this difference is partly an artifact of the way we selected the two 
dropout comparison groups. Since for these individuals we used their first spell that matched a 
spell where there was also one GED holder, we do not include future spells they may have had in 
calculating this percentage. Offenders who obtained a GED while in prison had slightly more 
disciplinary reports on their records (9.7) than did dropouts with some prison-based GED 
education (5.6) and dropouts with no prison-based GED education (5.9). GED holders are more 
likely to be in prison this spell for a property offense and less likely to be in prison for a drug-
related offense, relative to the uncredentialed dropout groups. 
Interestingly, GED failers has higher rates of participation in prison work release programs 
(24 percent) than either GED holders (20 percent) or dropouts (16 percent). Also, a higher 
                                                 
18 While not shown here, conditional on having prior prison experience, GED holders spent longer amounts of time 
in prison prior to this spell than the other groups (about 450 days for eventual GED holders compared to about 380 
days for the other dropout groups).    17 
percentage of GED failers spent some time in prison GED preparation programs (93 percent) 
than did offenders who took and passed the GED exams (68 percent). Meanwhile, offenders who 
obtained a GED while in prison participated in vocational training programs at higher rates than 
the two comparison groups. All groups had roughly similar participation rates in academic 
courses and work in prison industries. 
In terms of variables related to the dependent variables that will be used in the analyses, 
there are essentially no differences in earnings or employment prior to entry into this prison 
spell. In the post-release period, GED holders have a higher probability of being employed than 
does the dropout group who received no GED-related education while in prison (44 percent 
versus 37 percent), and they have higher mean quarterly earnings one year after release ($1,200 
versus $982). Meanwhile, the GED failers have post-release employment and earnings figures 
that lie between those of the GED holders and the no-education group of dropouts. 
Though the differences are small, comparisons across groups in the last rows of Table 1 are 
consistent with a hypothesis that obtaining a GED is effective in improving the post-release 
outcomes of offenders. The fact that there are observable differences between offenders who 
obtain a GED while in prison and those who do not cautions against making too much of the raw 
earnings and employment differences. In some instances GED holders have average 
characteristics that would lend an advantage in the labor market. In particularly, they are more 
likely to be white. In terms of criminal justice outcomes, however, offenders who obtain a GED 
look less favorable. They were more likely to have had a prior stay in prison and that stay was 
longer, they tend to have more disciplinary reports on their record, and they are more likely to   18 
have committed property crimes.
19 The empirical analyses that follow attempt to account for 
these and other potential differences between dropout offenders who do and do not obtain a GED 
while in prison. 
Figures 1-3 display mean quarterly earnings around the time of release based on t-time 
(Figure 1), r-time (Figure 2), and s-time (Figure 3). In these figures we include offenders who 
entered prison with a regular high school diploma to illustrate the fact that these offenders have 
substantially different outcomes than do dropout offenders with or without a prison-based GED. 
In Figures 1 and 2 the zero quarter represents the release quarter. In Figure 1 this represents the 
quarter in which individuals were actually released from prison, while in Figure 2 this represents 
the forecasted release date quarter. The patterns in these two graphs are roughly similar. 
Figures 1 and 2 indicate that even during quarters when most individuals are in prison (t-
time and r-time just before zero), there are non-zero quarterly earnings. Non-zero earnings 
during prison result primarily from employment emanating from prison work release centers. For 
example, about 17 percent of the offenders in our data were in work release centers at r = -1, 
working an average of 67 days during that quarter. 
Figure 3 shows that the earnings of all dropout groups are substantially lower than the pre-
spell earnings of high school graduates. Also in Figure 3, the pre-target spell earnings of all 
dropout groups are similar, offering some evidence that there are no substantial “pre-treatment” 
differences between those who will and will not obtain a prison GED.  An implication of this fact 
is accounting for earnings prior to prison (as in our fixed effects model in equation 4) will have 
little impact on GED coefficients.  Our hypothesis that GED program participants would have 
                                                 
19 Steurer, Smith, and Tracey (2001) also found that offenders who obtain prison-based educational programming 
look somewhat worse on some criminal justice-related measures than offenders who received no educational 
programming while in prison.   19 
higher earnings prior to participation than other dropouts was not confirmed, suggesting that the 
selection process of GED participation was not simply one in which those with better labor 
market prospects were also those that participated. 
Figures 1 and 2 offer, at best, weak evidence that dropouts who earned a GED while in 
prison have post-prison spell earnings that are different from dropouts who do not leave prison 
with a GED. Figures 1 and 2 do not, however, account for the role played by observable factors 
that may affect earnings and the other outcomes of interest. 
 
VI.  Results 
We first discuss results from a model that most closely resembles models used in prior 
research on the effectiveness of prison-based education programs, and we examine what happens 
to these estimates across specifications with increasing controls for observable factors. The most 
naïve estimates of the “effects” of prison-based education programs in the literature simply 
compare program participants and non-participants. In this spirit, our naïve estimates compare all 
offenders who leave prison with a GED, to those who do not, pooling all uncredentialed dropouts 
together, both the GED failers in our data and those who did not participate in some GED-related 
education while in prison. Estimates from this rudimentary specification, our equation 1, are in 
the first column of Panel A in Table 2, and they indicate that in the first year GED holders have 
mean quarterly earnings that are $181 higher than uncredentialed dropout offenders. The GED 
advantage is $180 in the second year, $109 in the third year, and all three estimates are 
statistically significant.
20  These mean earnings estimates are similar to the estimates for 
                                                 
20 While simplistic from the point of view of estimating the effect of a GED for an individual, these results may be 
relevant from the point of view of an employer with little information (say, only dropout and conviction status) 
trying to infer the expected productivity of GED and non-GED holders.   20 
participation in prison education programs by Steurer, Smith and Tracy (2001) discussed earlier, 
including the pattern of decreasing differences in the third year.   
The first innovations we bring to the topic are to allow differential GED effects for white 
and minority group members. The second and third columns of Panel A suggest that estimated 
mean differences based on a pooled sample, as in the first column, mask differential GED effects 
by race/ethnicity. Only the first year estimates in Panel A are statistically different for white and 
minority dropouts. The point estimate for minority group members in the second year is, 
however, twice as large as the estimate for whites and so we will continue to explore differences 
by race/ethnicity in the analyses that follow. Another reason for displaying results by 
race/ethnicity is an exploration of the declining GED “effects” in the third year for minority 
group seen in Panel A. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents results from equation 2. The results here indicate that the naïve 
estimates of Panel A are little changed by adding controls for basic characteristics such as age 
and education level. We continue to find the only statistically significant results for minority 
offenders in the results on stratified samples in columns 2 and 3, and it is only the first year 
estimates of the GED earnings advantage that is statistically different by race.
21 
The second innovation we bring to this line of research is our ability to include a much 
richer set of covariates than has heretofore been employed in research on prison-based education 
programs. OLS estimates from equation 3 are shown in Panel C of Table 2. The personal 
characteristics—including marital status, alien status, and state of residence and employment 
characteristics at the time of arrest—and prior criminal justice history that are controlled for in 
                                                 
21 We test this hypothesis in a model that constrains the effects of the other independent variables to be the same for 
whites and minority group members. The p-value on the interaction between the GED indicator and a dummy 
variable indicator for being white is 0.056 in the first year regression.   21 
equation 3 substantially reduce the estimated GED earnings advantage between Panels B and C. 
Reductions in the GED earnings premium occur for both white and minority group offenders, 
except for the minorities’ estimate in the second year after release where there is only a 10 
percent reduction in the estimate from Panel B to Panel C ($203 to $180). 
The third innovation we bring to this line of research is an ability to estimate models that 
control for individual fixed effects, as in equation 4. The estimates in Panel D of Table 2 indicate 
that once we control for the variables in the X vector in equation 3, there is little to be gained 
from fixed effects estimation. The estimates in Panels C and D are similar across groups and 
years.
22 
A first lesson from these estimates is that any credible research on the effects of prison-
based programs has to be able to control for more factors than has been the norm in this line of 
research. The inclusion of the additional covariates in the X vector of equation 3 drives the naïve 
estimates in column 1 to close to zero. Nevertheless, even with the richer control variable set, we 
continue to estimate differences between GED holders and all uncredentialed dropouts among 
minority offenders. Thus, a second lesson is that research on prison-based programs should pay 
attention to the possibility that estimated program effects may be different for white and minority 
offenders.  Remarkably, within the minority group there is little difference between the results 
that control for nothing in panel A and the results that control for a rich set of covariates and 
fixed effects in panel D. 
Results in Table 2 allow for an examination of naïve estimates of correctional education 
programs compared to what one would estimate allowing for differential effects by race/ethnicity 
                                                 
22 Comparing panel C to panel D, the point estimates increase slightly.  The reason for this is that the regression-
adjusted GED coefficient for the four quarters prior to the beginning of the prison spell (using equation 3) is 
insignificant but negative in sign.  Conditional on observable Xs, GED holders had slightly lower earnings prior to 
prison.   22 
and controlling for important observable differences between treatment and comparison group 
individuals. These results allow one to judge the results from typical prison education research 
relative to what one would find when sets of desirable control variables are included. Our 
primary interest, however, is answering our two research questions.  First, what is the impact on 
subsequent earnings of obtaining a GED relative to not having a GED program in prison at all? 
And second, is there value in actually obtaining the GED credential while in prison beyond 
effects of preparing for the exam itself? The estimates in Table 3 bring information to bear on 
these questions. 
The entries in the first two columns of Table 3 contrast the post-release quarterly earnings of 
offenders who obtained a GED to those of dropout offenders who did not participate in any GED 
preparation classes. In the ideal, the comparison group here estimates the counterfactual of what 
would have been the earnings of GED holders if there had been no prison GED program. 
Estimates in column 1 of Panel A show no measurable differences between the unadjusted 
earnings of white GED holders and white dropouts with no prison-based secondary education. 
Meanwhile, the simple contrasts among minority group members (column 2) show that GED 
holders earn about $220-$260 more per quarter in the first two years after release, but that this 
earnings advantage falls off sharply and approaches zero in the third post-release year. These 
same basic observations hold as we move down columns 1 and 2 through the different 
specifications. In particular, even the fixed effects estimates in Panel D are relatively similar to 
the unadjusted estimates of Panel A, showing no GED benefits for whites, and a GED earnings 
advantage of around $200 for minorities in the first two post-release years, falling to almost and 
statistical insignificance in the third post-release year.  Thus, the estimates for the minority group   23 
are not diminished very much even after controlling for a rich set of covariates and for fixed 
effects. 
The overarching story of the first two columns is that determining the value of a prison GED 
program depends highly on the group used to evaluate that question. It appears that white 
offenders have little to gain from a prison-based GED program; there are no statistically 
significant earnings differences by GED status and all of the point estimates are relatively small 
in magnitude. Meanwhile, minority group members who obtain a GED show consistently higher 
post-release earnings than minority dropout offenders with no prison-based GED-related 
education in the first two post-release years, an earnings advantage that consistently falls to near 
zero after the second year.
23 
We note that other work on the returns to a free world GED has found that all of the impact 
is at the bottom end of the skill distribution: the GED seems to have large earnings effects for the 
least skilled dropouts and none for high skilled dropouts (Tyler 2003). Using TABE test scores 
and TABE test versions to construct several different definitions of “low skilled” and “high 
skilled” dropouts, we do not find a similar pattern of differential GED effects by skill level for 
prison GEDs. 
Entries in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 bear on the question of the additional value of 
obtaining a prison-based GED once you have participated in prison secondary education 
programs. These estimates compare the post-release quarterly earnings of the same GED holders 
used in columns 1 and 2 to dropout offenders who participated in correctional GED programs but 
who left prison without the credential.  Fourteen percent of the comparison group attempted, but 
failed, the GED exams, while the other 86 percent never attempted the exams during their time in 
                                                 
23 In the fixed effects estimates of Panel D, it is only in the first year that the minority group results are statistically 
different from the results estimated over whites.   24 
prison. A common reason for having GED course hours but no record of attempting the GED 
exams is that the inmate has not achieved literacy and numeracy skill levels that would give a 
reasonable expectation of passing the GED exams at the time of their release from prison.  To the 
extent that the GED coefficient in this analysis is positive, it will in principle contain both the 
signaling value of the GED as well as the additional human capital that GED holders garner 
relative to offenders who study for but do not obtain a GED while in prison.  Results not shown 
in the table indicate that there is little relationship between GED test score and subsequent 
earnings among GED holders, however, so we infer that the GED coefficients in columns 3 and 
4 primarily represent a signaling effect.   
Even though we expected lower average skills in the comparison group than among GED 
holders, the estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 provide no consistent evidence of post-
release earnings differences between the two groups. In particular, the set of estimates for white 
offenders indicate no substantive or statistically significant GED earnings advantage. The fixed 
effects estimates for minority offenders yield the only evidence that GED holders fare better than 
offenders who obtain some prison based education, but no GED credential. The second year 
estimate for minority offenders is about as large as the second year estimate for minority 
offenders in column 2, and it is marginally statistically significant. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
The convergence of two trends has made an understanding of prison-based interventions 
such as the GED increasingly important. At the same time that low skilled individuals are facing 
increasingly dim economic prospects, there has been a dramatic increase in the U.S. prison 
population driven primarily by the incarceration of low skilled males. The result is a historically   25 
large proportion of inmates who, upon release, will face steep obstacles as they try to reintegrate 
into the mainstream labor market. A primary vehicle used to help prepare offenders for re-
entrance into society and the mainstream labor market has been the corrections-based GED 
program. In spite of the wide spread use of this program, however, there has been scant research 
on how effective it actually is in meeting the desired goals. Past research showing positive 
benefits of corrections-based education programs has been less than convincing, often because of 
inappropriate data. We utilize a unique and particularly rich data set on individuals who were in 
Florida prisons during the 1990s to produce the following main findings on one of the most 
important prison education programs, the GED 
1.  There is virtually no evidence that the earnings of white GED holders are higher than 
the post-release earnings white dropout offenders without a GED. This is true when 
the comparison is made against dropouts who have and have not had any prison-
based secondary education. 
2.  There is some evidence that having a GED program benefits minority offenders. 
When compared to minority offenders who never participated in GED-related 
education, minority group offenders with a GED had quarterly earnings that were 
approximately $200 higher in the first two years after release from prison. This 
represents about a 20 percent increase in earnings. 
3.  There is very little evidence that, conditional on participating in GED-related 
education, there is extra benefit to actually acquiring the credential. 
4.  Any benefits that accrue to minority offenders from obtaining a GED appear to fade 
substantially after the second year.   26 
The two most robust findings are the racial/ethnic differences in any returns to a prison GED 
and the fall off in any GED benefits for minority offenders after the second year. Both results 
show up in the point estimates of virtually all models and regardless of the samples used in the 
estimation.  Participation in education programming may be driven more by a desire to impress 
prison and parole officials and improve one’s situation in prison than by a desire to impact one’s 
post-release labor market outcomes.
24 To the extent that this is the case in our Florida data, and 
to the extent that this rationale for participation in prison-based education programming is more 
prevalent among white offenders, this could help explain the differential results we see by 
race/ethnicity. Unfortunately there is no information in our data that would allow us to explore 
this possibility. 
The virtual disappearance of any GED effect between the second and third years after 
release for minority offenders is also puzzling. In analysis not shown here but available from the 
authors, we use a smaller sample of offenders for whom we have 16 full quarters of post-release 
earnings data. The downward trend of the estimated GED effect on the earnings of minority 
offenders also appears in year three in these data and continues to diminish in year four after 
release. In trying to understand this puzzling trend we can rule out differential recidivism rates 
and post-release community supervision rates as possible explanations since separate analyses 
not shown in this paper show no effects of a prison GED on either recidivism or post-release 
                                                 
24 Possible explanation for race-based differences in any GED effects is suggested in the work of Steurer, Smith, and 
Tracey (2001). In a survey they administered to offenders just prior to release in 1997-1998, they find that relative to 
offenders with no prison-based educational programming, offenders who had participated in education programs 
while in prison reported a consistently lower motivation in regard to several labor market activities including the 
“motivation to get a job, a better job, or higher pay” or the “motivation to improve job performance.” While none of 
the differences between those who did and did not participate in prison education were statistically significant (at the 
0.01 level), the point estimates consistently pointed to a negative correlation between prison-based education 
participation and labor market motivation. On the other hand, offenders in the Steurer et al. study who participated 
in prison-based education programs indicated a higher motivation to both “look good to prison or parole officials to 
get out” and to “get a better situation in prison” than did offenders who did not participate in education 
programming while in prison.     27 
community supervision.
25 Regarding the downward trend in the GED earnings effect, we can 
only note at this point that the same downward trend, after initial positive effects, was found by 
Steurer, Smith and Tracy (2001), and is a result worthy of further study.  
While we find evidence of a short-term GED impact on earnings for minority offenders, we 
also note that participation in prison-based GED programs may generate non-economic benefits 
that we have not examined.
26  Also, it could be that obtaining a GED confers post-release 
benefits that are not directly connected to the labor market such as the ability to be a better parent 
or more effectively engage in the civic life of the free world. Were this systematically the case, 
however, one would expect GED holders to recidivate at lower rates, something we did not find. 
In short, there may be advantages to corrections-based GED programs not examined in this 
paper. 
Our data contain no clear source of exogenous variation in GED status. This is particularly 
problematic in a prison setting where there are fierce selection issues at both the administrative 
and the individual level. We try to address heterogeneity issues as best we can by using both an 
unusually rich data set on criminal justice offenders and by fitting fixed effects models that 
control for time invariant heterogeneity. We do think that the fixed effects estimates in this paper 
represent the most vigorous attempt to date to obtain good estimates of the impact of obtaining a 
GED while in prison on later outcomes. Nevertheless, since we have no transparent manner of 
controlling for potential time-varying heterogeneity, caution should be exercised in attaching 
causal inferences to our estimates. 
                                                 
25 In this analysis we define recidivism as being convicted of a crime within three years of the forecasted release date 
that results in a return to prison or probation, 
26 For example, security considerations are of paramount importance in correctional institutions, and it could be that 
participation in a GED preparation program leads to better behavior while incarcerated. While this is possible, we 
did not find that GED program participants in our data had fewer disciplinary reports during the target spell than did 
the comparison groups. Still, given the importance of security issues, this is an area that deserves a closer look.   28 
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    Dropouts who 
leave prison with 
a GED 
  Uncredentialed 
GED “failers” 
  Uncredentialed 
dropouts offenders 
with no GED-related 
education 
N    1,967    1,400    9,589 
             
% white    60    47    45 
% black    32    45    46 
% Hispanic    7    7    8 
% other race    0.3    0.5    0.3 
mean years education 
 
  9.7 
(1.3) 
  9.5 
(1.3) 
  9.5 
(1.4) 
mean age at admission 
 
  25.6 
(8.0) 
  25.0 
(7.5) 
  29.4 
(9.2) 
% age 18-20 at admission    28    31    15 
% age 21-25 at admission    28    31    24 
% age 26-30 at admission    15    12    18 
% age 31-35 at admission    11    10    16 
% age 36-40 at admission    7    6    13 
% age over 40 at admission   6    5    12 
% with prior incarceration 
spell 
  24    13    18 
% with prior disciplinary 
report 
  10    6    6 
% with violent crime 
offense this spell 
  39    39    36 
% with property crime 
offense this spell 
  41    37    36 
% with drug  
crime offense this spell 
  16    21    24 
% with other 
crime offense this spell 
  4    4    4 
% participated in work 
release program 
  20    24    14 
mean days in work release 
for participants 
  171 
(103) 
  172 
(98) 
  165 
(98) 
% with hours in GED 
classes this spell 
  68    93    0 
% with hours in vocational 
training this spell 
  28    19    10 
% with hours in academic 
classes this spell
a 
  28    27    29 
% with hours working in 
prison industry this spell 
  3    2    3   31 
mean sentence length in 
months this spell 
  19.9 
(10.5) 
  17.7 
(9.6) 
  14.4 
(9.0) 
% who recidivate within 1 
year 
  17    16    16 
% who recidivate within 2 
years 
  26    27    25 
% employed one year 
before prison entry 
  32    32    31 
% employed one year after 
release 
  44    41    37 
quarterly wage one year 
before prison entry 
  560 
(1364) 
  526 
(1336) 
  577 
(1401) 
quarterly wage one year 
after release 
  1200 
(2108) 
  1132 
(2827) 
  982 
(2092) 
a. Represents non-GED-related academic coursework. 
       Notes.  Sample standard deviations in parentheses.   32 
 
Table 2 
Quarterly earnings of 
GED holders vs. uncredentialed dropouts 
  Years 
after 
release 
  All 
(1) 
  Whites 
(2) 






























  101 
(71) 
  39 
(72) 
Panel A:  
Controlling 
  NOTHING   





























  67 
(73) 




  AGE  
  YRQTR 
  EDUC 





























  -9 
(80) 




  AGE  
  YRQTR 
  X 





























  58 
(87) 




  AGE  
  YRQTR 
  X 
  ai 
             
N      12,956    6,138    6,818 
 
Notes.  Panels A, B, C, and D contain GED coefficient estimates d1, d2, d3, and d4 from equations 1, 2, 
3, and 4 respectively.  All entries in column 1 are from models that also control for race/ethnicity.  The 
dependent variable is quarterly earnings in 2002 dollars, including zeros.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses, adjusted for clustering within individuals over time.  
~ = p<0.10; 
* = p<0.05; 
** = p<0.01.     33 
 
Table 3 
Quarterly earnings of GED holders vs. 
GED-program non-participants and GED “failers,” by race/ethnicity 
      Comparison to dropouts 
with no GED-related 
education 
  Comparison to GED 
“failers” 
  Years 
after 
release 
  Whites 
(1) 
  Minorities 
(2) 
  Whites 
(3) 











  34 
(84) 
  122 
(85) 
                  2
nd 
year 





  42 
(99) 
  116 
(93) 
                  3
rd 
year 
  105 
(72) 
  39 
(73) 
  79 
(106) 
  36 
(98) 
Panel A:  
Controlling 
  NOTHING 









  -37 
(82) 
  16 
(84) 
                  2
nd 
year 





  18 
(99) 
  56 
(93) 
                  3
rd 
year 
  56 
(75) 
  68 
(77) 
  71 
(105) 
  20 
(99) 
Panel B:  
Controlling 
  AGE  
  YRQTR 
  EDUC   









  -19 
(87) 
  28 
(84) 
                  2
nd 
year 





  33 
(109) 
  125 
(96) 
                  3
rd 
year 
  -28 
(83) 
  -8 
(95) 
  99 
(112) 




  AGE  
  YRQTR 
  X 














                  2
nd 
year 










                  3
rd 
year 
  57 
(91) 
  34 
(100) 
  83 
(120) 




  AGE  
  YRQTR 
  X 
  ai 
                 
                   
N      5,475    6,081    1,849    1,518 
 
Notes.  Panels A, B, C, and D contain GED coefficient estimates d1, d2, d3, and d4 from equations 1, 2, 
3, and 4 respectively.  The dependent variable is quarterly earnings in 2002 dollars, including zeros.  
Standard errors are in parentheses, adjusted for clustering within individuals over time.  
~ = p<0.10; 
* = 
p<0.05; 
** = p<0.01.   
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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